The section from Friedrich Nietzsche troubles me. I have been having a hard time getting my mind around the concepts he presents. Maybe he would say that my confusion is the result of his using language as the vehicle to express those concepts. After all, language is only a representation of the perceptions of things (concepts, for instance), not the things themselves (1169).
He says, “we believe that we know something about the things themselves when we speak of trees, colors, snow, and flowers; and yet we possess nothing but metaphors for things—metaphors which correspond in no way to the original entities” (1174). In his contention that language is an arbitrary construction which cannot fully characterize the actual, I recognize some Plato—I thought often of the allegory of the cave as I read the excerpt. I’m not really sure, however, just how that plays out in rhetorical study/ theory. It seems he is remarking on the limitations of language; Blair did the same thing, but Blair ties the limitations to figurative language—he believes it is natural for humans to develop figurative language because of the narrow scope of concrete language. I see Nietzsche digging one level further down from that. His remarks are more a reflection of a different epistemology: he says much about what (he believes) it means to be human when he talks about language as an attempt to gain control over the world around us. In Nietzsche, the principle powers of human intellect are exerted toward “dissimulation” (1172)—we mask real meaning, we play roles for social convention’s sake; we lie. The editors point out that Nietzsche recognizes within human beings “the need to communicate” (1170), but if the communication is only based on the “will to power” or the attempt to exert control over the world, then his definition of communication seems rather dark.
I will say that his worldview differs greatly from mine; I recognize the existence of Truth (as well as truth) and my perceptions of language tie in to, and often rest upon, that assumption. I can see the correlation between Nietzsche’s rejection of Truth, his view of the nature of human beings, and his questioning of language.
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2 comments:
I think your explication of Nietzsche’s view of language as ultimately resting on a “will to power” is accurate. You conclude that “his definition of communication seems rather dark.” The way this will to power usually works is indeed dark: a vision of the world imposed on us by those around us from birth, expressed in a language to which we are likewise urged to conform, and in regards to which those who attempt to exert choice or change are looked upon as troublemakers or, worse still, are simply regarded as incomprehensible, even insane. Dark indeed. But there is hope. Thus, Nietzsche urges us to exert our own will and to push back against this stale uniformity which is driven by a pressure to conform, and to play—child-like—with concepts and categories, to expand the repertoire of perspectives, words, and concepts that those around us insist is all there is and explore a little bit the endless possibilities for their recombination in the few years in which a few of us are lucky enough to follow a will that abandons the small and mediocre and selfish focus within which society attempts to inscribe our vision and instead to grapple with but never comprehend that subtle mystery that has combined a will and a body to make a unique—and transitory—individual…and finally to express a vision that is yours and yours alone. That is not dark (or heavy). It is light (and light).
Wow, that comment opened some things up for me. Until I considered the "pushing back" aspect, all I was getting was the idea of fickle language defeating us--mastering us--at every turn. Sort of like, it's all we've got but we can't really do anything with it except deceive to one degree or another. "express a vision that is yours and yours alone": every rhetorician would hope to claim that.
I do pick up that Nietzsche sees language, and therefore rhetoric, as fluid. quite a contrast to the static it-is-or-it-ain't view of rhetoric.
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